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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
school boards. Simultaneously, the decisions have increased the
pressure on school boards to eliminate racially motivated faculty
assignment, and to base employment decisions on objective nondis-
criminatory standards. Most important though, the court of appeals
has again moved closer to making the mandate of Brown v. Board of
Educ.-now more than twelve years in existence-a reality.
PHILIP L. KELLOGG
Constitutional Law-Compulsory Blood Tests-Self-Incrimination
Recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States
involving the rights of the accused in state criminal proceedings
have attracted the attention of state law enforcement officials who,
undoubtedly, are concerned with the present Court's concept of the
scope of the fourth, fifth and sixth amendments. Schmerber v.
California,1 unlike most recent decisions, restricts the scope of the
fifth amendment and affords state police with a clear guideline.
Petitioner was convicted in Los Angeles municipal court of the
criminal offense of driving an automobile while under the influence
of alcohol. He was arrested at a hospital where he was receiving
treatment for injuries received in an* accident involving the auto-
mobile that he had been driving. At the direction of a police officer,
a blood sample was taken from petitioner at the hospital and an
analysis of this sample indicated by weight of alcohol in his blood
that the petitioner was intoxicated at the time of the accident.'
Petitioner objected to use of this test as evidence on the grounds
that the blood was withdrawn dispite his refusal on advice of coun-
sel to consent to it.
He contended that the admission of the test as evidence denied
him due process of law under the fourteenth amendment of the Con-
stitution as well as his specific rights under the fourth, fifth and
sixth amendments as incorporated in the fourteenth amendment.
The California court rejected these contentions and affirmed the
conviction. The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Bren-
nan, held that the blood test, even though compulsary, did not vio-
1384 U.S. 757 (1966).
Concerning the reliability of blood tests as evidence of intoxication see
Ladd & Gibson, The Medico-Legal Aspects of the Blood Test to Determine
Intoxication, 24 IowA L. REv. 191 (1939) [hereinafter cited as Ladd &
Gibson].
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late the petitioner's constitutional rights. This note will restrict it-
self to the Court's application of the fifth amendment's self-incrimi-
nation clause to compulsary blood tests.
Schmerber represents the resolution, at least temporarily, of a
legal and scholarly disagreement over the nature and scope of the
privilege against self-incrimination. Several writers and courts have
interpreted and applied the privilege narrowly with reference to its
historical origins, while others have asserted that the privilege in
the fifth amendment, together with the fourth and sixth amend-
ments, is a broad principle of civil liberty designed to protect the
citizen from intrusions upon his personality and body by the gov-
ernment.
According to one writer, the significant historical fact in judging
the privilege today is that it originally dealt only with testimonial
communications compelled from the accused in court; in other words,
the privilege was first directed at the inquisitorial system. Compul-
sion alone was not the basis of the privilege but testimonial compul-
sion-each idea being essential to the other.8 This historical em-
phasis on compelled oral testimony, as distinguished from compelled
real or physical evidence, becomes the main reason for the Court's
opinion in Schmerber. It is generally recognized that the privilege
evolved from the abuse of the ex officio oath by the Star Chamber
in England during the first half of the seventeenth century. By
that time, the inquisitorial oath was a well established rule of can-
non law in ecclesiastical courts; the accused, subsequent to proper
presentment with charges of heresy or sedition was required to take
an oath that'he would answer all questions truthfully. The original
objection to the oath resulted from one particular procedure by
which, the oath was put into operation: the ex officio charging of
the accused by the court itself rather than by indictment based on
probable cause. The over zealous Star Chamber found the oath a
powerful tool in dealing with heresy and sedition cases; it frequent-
ly used the technique of "fishing out", evidence of some crime upon
which to base the conviction of some unpopular political or religious
figure.4 The end of the Star Chamber and the oath itself was pre-
3 Id. at 226-27.
'8 WIGMAoE, EVIDENCE § 2250 (McNaughton Rev. 1961) [hereinafter
cited as WIGMORE]. This treatise gives a detailed and extensively docu-
mented history of the development of the privilege against self-incrimination
and an equally extensive treatment of- the ex officio oath.
176 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45
cipitated by the famous Lilburn trial.5 Lilburn, charged with print-
ing seditious and heretical literature, refused to take the oath before
the Star Chamber on the grounds that he was improperly indicted-
he did not question the legality of the oath. Lilburn's resulting
conviction for contempt served to aggravate the growing reaction
to the abuses of the Star Chamber and, in 1641, by an act of Parlia-
ment, the Star Chamber was abolished and the ex officio oath was
forbidden in any church trial involving a penal charge.'
The second stage of the development of the privilege against
self-incrimination involved its emergence in common law courts.
The privilege did not appear as a rule of law until the 1700's. In
spite of the fact that there was no judicial abuse of the inquisatorial
oath in common law courts that paralleled the abuse by the Star
Chamber,7 the Lilburn trial had great impact and it began to be
claimed by defendants and conceded by courts that no man was
bound to incriminate himself on any criminal charge in any court.
Eventually the privilege was applied to any witness,' whether or
not he was a defendant in a criminal trial.
The American courts knew of the privilege because their lawyers
went to English inns of court to study law,9 but it is possible that
support for the privilege developed, in part, due to the colonies' own
experience with the Courts of Governor and Council which applied
the strict English trade laws. This fact indicates that the privilege
may have been given constitutional status to check executive rather
than judicial abuse of the inquisitorial power and leads one writer
to conclude that "the privilege did not acquire constitutional status
because it was deemed a palladium of individual liberty; it has come
to be deemed a palladium of individual liberty because it has acquired
constitutional status.' 01
In any event, whatever the origin or policy behind the privilege
'Lilburn's Trial, 3 How. St. Tr. 1315 (1645).08 WIGMORE § 2250, at 282-83.
7 Wigmore writes that the jury trial came to be used because "wager of
law" was more or less a privilege to the defendant. The use of the inquisi-
torial oath would have impaired the value of the jury trial since the defen-
dant would have an opportunity to free himself by his own testimony. For
this reason the oath was not used before the jury but it was used in all other
proceedings. Id. at 285-86.Old. at 286-90.
SId. at 294.
1
*MAYER, SHALL WE AMEND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 182 (1959).
Wigmore takes the position that the framers intended that the fifth amend-
ment protect the citizen from executive abuse. 8 WiGaO § 2250, at 295.
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in colonial America, the nineteenth century courts interpreted the
fifth amendment as a fundamental individual right.' The privilege
has been extended to situations other than testimony compelled from
the accused at trial, and it is this fact that has led courts into diffi-
culty and controversy in trying to establish the policy behind the
privilege as well as the scope of its application to various fact situa-
tions. As a general rule, the decisions which have extended the
privilege to other than the forced testimony of the accused at trial
have set their reasons in broad terms of freedom and civil liberty
in an obvious effort to afford later courts latitude in dealing with
different fact situations.
Several examples will illustrate this point. Counselman v. Hitch-
cock held that the fifth amendment was applicable to all witnesses
at grand jury investigations and stated, "The privilege is limited to
criminal matters, but it is as broad as the mischief against which
it seeks to guard."' 2 In Boyd v. United States, 3 the Supreme Court
held that a man cannot be compelled to produce private papers in a
civil action involving penalty or forfeiture. Although recognizing
that compelling production of private papers is less objectionable
than other practices, the Court argued:
It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least
repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get
their first footing in that way, namely: by silent approaches and
slight deviations from the legal modes and procedure. This can
only be obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional pro-
visions for the security of person and property should be liberal-
ly construed. A close and literal construction deprives them of
half their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the right,
as if it consisted more in sound than in substance.' 4
Brain v. United States,15 in holding a confession involuntary,
stated that both the fourth and fifth amendments contemplated prin-
ciples of humanity and civil liberty. More recently, in a case involv-
ing in-custody confessions to the police, Mr. Chief Justice Warren,
speaking for the Court in holding the confessions involuntary and
therefore inadmissable, pointed out that .the history of the privilege
against self-incrimination is one of a constant groping for the proper
"MAYER, SHALL WE AMEND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 182 (1959).12 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892).
'8 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
"Id. at 635.
' 168 U.S. 532, 544 (1897).
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scope of governmental power.'" The privilege is founded on a com-
plex of values and all "these policies point to one overriding thought:
the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect
a government-state or federal-must accord to the dignity and in-
tegrity of its citizens," and furthermore, "justice demands that a
government seeking to punish an individual produce the evidence
against him by its own independent labors, rather than by the cruel,
simple expedient of compelling it from his own mouth."'17 The
cases above, while not directly related to the testimonial-real evi-
dence distinction raised in Schmerber, give some indication that the
Supreme Court has not limited itself to the historical origins of the
privilege when applying the fifth amendment.
Cases of this sort have not gone without criticism. The chief
criticism is that the courts have gone to great length in extolling
the general merits of the fifth amendment but generally have failed
to analyze it carefully to determine whether the application given
to it honestly fits the original purpose of the privilege. By covering
up the factual issue with general discussions of the broad principles,
the privilege has been extended improperly.'" Wigmore, who was
undoubtably the foremost proponent of the position ultimately taken
by the Court in Schmerber-that the fifth amendment does not
extend to compelled physical evidence but only to evidence of a
communicative or testimonial nature--asserts that the policy behind
the privilege is often completely overlooked, a fact which has re-
sulted in the broad civil liberty concept of the fifth amendment. Ac-
cording to Wigmore, this conception is completely unwarranted by
the historical development of or the policy behind the privilege' 9
Wigmore's position is that the policy behind the privilege is the
protection of the accused against being forced to reveal private
thoughts or beliefs, a protection not afforded in Star Chamber
heresy and sedition trials. This protection is accomplished best by
allowing the accused to remain silent at trial. 0 Support for this
"0 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966).
17 Id. at 460.
a Ladd & Gibson 225, 238.
8 WIGMORE §§ 2263-64.20Id. § 2263. For an examination of many writers' views on the policy
behind the privilege see Id. at § 2251 n.2. Reasons frequently given for the
existence of the privilege are: (1) It protects the innocent from convicting
himself by a bad performance on the witness stand, (2) it avoids burdening
the courts with false testimony, (3) it incourages third party witnesses by
removing the fear of self-incrimination, (4) it recognizes the practical limits
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position can be found in numerous state cases,21 and in Holt v.
United States,2" where it was held that requiring the defendant to
try on a blouse for the purpose of identification did not violate his
fifth amendment rights. Mr. Justice Holmes called the objection to
the evidence "an extravagant extension of the fifth amendment"
23
and held that the privilege only applied to extortion of a communi-
cation from the accused through physical or moral compulsion. This
approach rejects any analogy between coerced confessions and
coerced physical evidence. One writer, in a discussion of the ad-
missibility of blood tests, goes a step farther and states that it is
historically inaccurate to apply the privilege to coerced confessions.
Coerced confessions are inadmissable because they are unreliable.
Being completely reliable, blood tests should be admitted as evidence,
regardless of how they are obtained.24 The argument that the fifth
amendment is not applicable to pretrial coerced confessions is not
in line with the present case law on the subject,25 but the statement
that the unreliability of coerced testimony is the real policy behind
the privilege has been frequently asserted.2 6 However in Rochin v.
California,2 7 Mr. Justice Frankfurter said that coerced confessions
are excluded because they offend the community's sense of fair play-
and decency. In that case, the petitioner was arrested and forced to
submit to having his stomach pumped to see if it contained narcotic
capsules. While this case was decided on the basis of the defendant's
right to due process under the fourteenth amendment rather than
upon his privilege against self-incrimination, Justice Frankfurter
appears to have had.the privilege in mind. He referred to the dis-
tinction between real and testimonial evidence and concluded that
there was no difference between a coerced confession and a forced
pumping of the stomach. s
of governmental power, (5) it is justified by history, (6) it prevents Star
Chamber tactics, (7) it preserves respect for the legal process, (8) it in-
courages the prosecutor to conduct a thorough investigation, (9) it frus-
trates bad laws, especially in the area of beliefs, (10) it protects the defen-
dant from fishing by the state, (11) it prevents cruel and inhuman treat-
ment, and (12) it creates a fair state-individual balance. Id. § 2251, at
310-15.
"See Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 1407 (1952); 8 WIGMOal § 2265 n.6.22218 U.S. 245 (1910).3Id. at 252.
24Ladd & Gibson 228.
25Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
" 8 WIGMORE § 2251, at 310-15.27342 U.S. 165 (1952).
" Id. at 173; see United States v. Townsend, 151 F. Supp. 378 (D.D.C.
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This case may have set a different stage for Schmerber had it
not been sharply limited by the Court's decision in Breithaupt v.
Abram.2 9 In Breithaupt, the Court was confronted with a factual
situation similar to the one in Schmerber (the petitioner was un-
conscious when a blood sample was taken), but at that time the fifth
amendment was not applicable to the states.3" The Court held that
taking the blood sample did not violate the defendant's right to due
process and distinguished the case from Rochin. According to the
Court, Rochin held that the conduct of the police shocked the consci-
ence and implied that it was not the pumping of the stomach but
the totality of the official conduct that violated due process. 1 It is
clear that the Court in Breithaupt gave little consideration to Frank-
furter's rejection of the distinction between coerced confessions and
coerced physical evidence. Mr. Justice Clark reasoned that there is
nothing basically brutal or offensive in taking blood samples without
the consent of the accused since these tests are used as a matter of
routine in America.32 In his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice War-
ren asserted that there is no distinction between blood tests and
stomach pumping and that the Court made Rochin stand for no
more than the personal reaction of this Court to particular police
methods.33
In Schmerber, the Court was faced for the first time with the
issue of whether a blood test violated the defendant's privilege
against self-incrimination. Malloy v. Hogan34 held that the fifth
amendment applies to state criminal proceedings. The Court in
Schmerber concluded that the facts in the case were in no way dis-
1957) (blood specimen forceably taken from defendant's penis) which said
that Rochin casts doubt on the real-testimonial evidence distinction and said
that Rochit's reasoning was applicable to the fifth amendment. But see
Blackford v. United States, 247 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1957) (narcotics con-
tainer forceably removed from defendant's rectum). The court adhered
strictly to the distinction.
352 U.S. 432 (1957); 37 B.U.L. Rnv. 360; LA. L. R~v. 840; 36 N.C.L.
REv. 76; 11 VAND. L. REv. 196.
"Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
2 Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 438 (1957).
"Id. at 435-36. The Court noted that modem community living stan-
dards require modern crime techniques.
" Id. at 435-46. Warren also argued that the Court's opinion implies
that a different result would obtain if defendant had resisted more vigorous-
ly. This would put a premium on lack of cooperation.
"378 U.S. 1 (1964). Mr. justice Brennan, who wrote this opinion,
spoke in terms of broad civil liberty concepts in applying the fifth amend-
ment. This opinion should be compared to his language in Schmerber.
[Vol. 45
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tinguishable from those in Breithaupt as far as due process was
concerned.35 Recognizing, however, that the self-incrimination issue
was unsettled, Mr. Justice Brennan stated:
We hold that the privilege protects an accused only from being
compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the
state with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature,
and that the withdrawal of blood and use of the analysis in ques-
tion in this case did not involve compulsion to those ends.86
The Court rejected the position that "the scope of the privilege
coincided with the complex of values it helps to protect."37 Ad-
mitting that the privilege requires the state to produce evidence by
its own independent labors and that the state must respect the in-
violability of the human personality, the Court said that Miranda v.
Arizona8 implicitly recognizes that the fifth amendment has never
been given the full scope which the values it helps protect suggest,
and concluded that history and a long line of state and lower federal
courts have consistently limited the privilege's protection to situa-
tions where the state seeks to submerge those values by the simple
expedient of forcing evidence from the defendant's own mouth."9
As precedent for the view that the privilege does not apply to
physical evidence, the Court cited Holt v. United States."' The rule
was explained as follows :41 the privilege does exclude compelled evi-
dence of testimonial or communicative nature, written or oral; but
it does not exclude compelled evidence that is physical or real; e.g.,
compelling defendant to give writing or voice samples, to give finger-
prints, or to stand in court.4" However, it was admitted that the
distinction cannot always be drawn as in the case of the use of a
lie detector which according to the Court calls to mind the spirit of
" 384 U.S. at 760.
so Ibid.
37 Id. at 762.
- 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
39 384 U.S. at 763.
,o Ibid.
'lId. at 764.
"' For discussions of the several views on what the privilege excludes
see 8 WIGMORE § 2263; Danforth, Death Knell for the Pretrial Mental Ex-
amination, 19 RUTGERs L. REv. 489, 492 n.16 (1965); Inbau, Self Incrimi-
nation--What an Accused Person Can Be Compelled to Do, 28 J. Cnin.
L., C. & P.S. 261 (1937); Weintraub, Voice Identification, Writing Er-
emplars and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 10 VAIn). L. REv.
485 (1956-57); 44 Ky. L.J. 353 (1955-56).
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the fifth amendment.3 In fact, the Court cautioned that its holding
should not be understood as accepting the Wigmore rule,4 4 but it
appears that, for practical purposes, the Court has done just that.
At least it is clear that the Court does accept tacitly the Wigmore
position that the policy behind the privilege is not the broad principle
of civil liberty as conceived in prior cases.
Mr. Justice Black, in his dissent, specifically took issue with the
testimonial-physical evidence distinction and stated that there was
no precedent for this choice of words in past decisions of the Court
but only the scholarly precedent of Wigmore in his treatise on evi-
dence. 5 In his view, the Court strayed away from the guidelines
laid down in Boyd. Justice Black argued, "It is a strange hierar-
chy of values that allows the state to extract a human being's blood
to convict him of a crime because of the blood's contents but pro-
scribes production of lifeless papers (a reference to Boyd)."7 The
Court has simply failed to give the fifth amendment the liberal con-
struction called for in cases like Boyd, Counselnan and Miranda,
and instead, has given it an unwarranted technical construction.4
The decision, according to Justice Black, provides the Court with a.
handy instrument for further narrowing of the fifth amendment,
and other basic rights."
Perhaps the Court considered the interest of society in promot-
ing highway safety as superior to any interest of the individual in
the inviolability of his body. This was the position taken in Breit-
haupt. Yet, the Court failed to discuss specifically any policy con-
siderations of this nature and rested its decision of the fifth amend-
ment issue on the evidentiary distinction made by Wigmore in his
analysis of the history of the privilege against self-incrimination.
Few legal principles are of much value if kept static; this seems
particularly true of constitutional rights. Whether the framers in-
"Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966).
"Id. at 763 n.7.
4 Id. at 772.
Id. at 776-77.
" Id. at 775.
,AId. at 776-77. Justice Black rejects the Court's interpretaiion of Mi-
randa. His position is that Miranda requires a broad and liberal construc-
tion of the privilege.
" Id. at 778. Mr. Justice Douglas, in his dissent, Id. at 778, adheres to
his dissent and Chief Justice Warren's dissent in Breithaupt, but also asserts
that Schinerber involves the right of privacy which was held to exist within
the Bill of Rights in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
[Vol. 45
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tended that the fifth amendment be applied strictly in line with its
historical origins or that it be considered a broad principle designed
to take care of unforeseeable judicial abuses is a question that is
particularly pertinent to the use of compulsary blood tests. Although
blood tests may not be very objectionable in themselves, it is possible
that other medical and scientific tests will be developed which might
not be as unobjectionable as blood tests. For this reason, it is
regrettable that the Court has failed to support its decision with ap-
propriate considerations of the policy and scope of the privilege.
ALBERT VICTOR WRAY
Constitutional Law-Prejudicial Publicity in Criminal Proceedings
The free press-fair trial controversy has occasioned much pub-
lic discussion on how best to accommodate the conflicting guaran-
ties of the first and sixth amendments in the law enforcement
process without making the latter unworkable. In Sheppard v. Max-
well,' the United States Supreme Court faced the problem squarely
for the ninth time in fifteen years, clarifying again the constitu-
tional requirement of jury impartiality, and encouraging for the
first time a more vigorous use of existing procedural devices to
protect the individual from prejudicial publicity. The murder of
Dr. Sheppard's wife "captivated the attention of the news media in
an unprecedented manner."' Much of the damaging publicity, both
before and during the trial, was the result of leaks to the press by
the police, county officials and the district attorney's office. The
press aired much of the evidence, some of it "doctored," and some
of it never admitted at the trial; publicized petitioner's refusal to
take a lie detector test; criticized the "protective ring" thrown up
by his family; and, when the police investigation appeared to be
uncovering too little, campaigned for an inquest and his eventual
arrest. The three-day televised inquest was held in a gymnasium,
where the coroner received "cheers, hugs and kisses from ladies" in
the audience when he forcibly ejected the petitioner's chief counsel.
At the trial itself, held two weeks before both the judge and the
prosecutor were up for election, newsmen crowded into the court-
'384 U.S. 333 (1966).2 Sheppard v. Mamvell, 231 F. Supp. 37, 40 (S.D. Ohio 1964), rev'd,
346 F.2d 707 (6th Cir. 1965).
